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Reason and the Heart: A Prolegomenon to a Critique of Passional Reason, by
William J. Wainwright. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,
1995. Pp. x,160.
MARK R. TALBOT, Wheaton College
Do our passions-our needs and interests, hopes and fears, wishes and
willings, tastes and inclinations, feelings and attitudes-ever playa positive role in the epistemic justification of our beliefs? If they do, what
role (or roles) do they properly play? More particularly, how might they
contribute to the adequate assessment of the evidence for religious
belief?
Suspecting that many contemporary philosophers of religion underestimate the role that evidence can and should play in mature Christian
belief, William Wainwright sets out to show how religious belief may be
based on evidence, but on evidence that can only be properly appreciated by those possessing specific moral and spiritual qualities.
Evidentialism claims our beliefs-or some proper subset of them"are rationally held if and only if one has sufficient evidence for them"
(p. 2). Many Christians, including John Locke, have been evidentialists
about religious belief, assuming not only that there is good evidence for
it but also that the evidence will convince all fairminded inquirers. ' Yet
two interrelated facts have led many to deny evidentialism as applied to
religious belief: first, none of the evidence for it seems compelling to all
"fully informed, sufficiently intelligent, and adequately trained inquirer[s]" (p. 3); and, second, it "seems to depend more directly on the state
of one's heart or moral temperament than on evidence" (ibid.).
Here Wainwright proposes a middle way: perhaps God is not known
either by 1II0bjective reason,' that is, by an understanding that systematically excludes passion, desire, and emotion" from the reasoning process (p. 3)
or "only 'subjectively,' or by the heart" (ibid.), independently of any reasoning process. Perhaps proper religious belief results from processes that
place" a high value on proofs, arguments, and inferences" even as they recognize "that a properly disposed heart is needed to see their force" (ibid.).
This gives reason-as inference from evidence-an important although not
unqualified place in the apprehension and defense of religious truth.
Similar positions have appeared throughout philosophy's history.
For instance, Aristotle claimed that our knowledge of the good life-our
recognizing the right practical principles to be true-depends on our
psychological health. 2 Yet they have probably been most common in the
Christian tradition; for, as Wainwright says, the claim that Christianity's
evidence can only "be accurately assessed ... by men and women who
possess the proper moral and spiritual qualifications ... was once a
Christian commonplace" (p. 3) held by thinkers as seemingly diverse as
Calvin and Aquinas (see p. 4).
This position was especially popular in the Reformed tradition of
English and American Puritanism, and so it is especially appropriate
that Wainwright's primary emphasis, in elucidating and evaluating it, is
on the American Puritan, Jonathan Edwards.
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At first glance, as Wainwright stresses, Edwards's position makes it
seem that he held contradictory attitudes towards reason. For philosophically Edwards was a foundationalist and an evidentialist who was
undeniably attracted by the "almost uncritical confidence in reason's
power and scope" (p. 7) that Continental Rationalists such as Nicholas
Malebranche, Cambridge Platonists like Henry More and John Smith,
the British Empiricist John Locke/ and the Newtonians all shared. This
means that he often proceeded in the confidence that many truths about
God could be philosophically established. 4 Yet theologically Edwards
was "a Calvinist who shared the Reformed tradition's distrust of
humanity's natural capacities and its skepticism about natural theology"
(ibid.). And so he could claim that, without divine assistance, even "'the
best reasoner in the world ... might be led into the grossest errors and
contradictions'" about God and His world (p. 8).
The appearance of contradiction disappears, however, when
Edwards's position is fully elucidated. His Calvinism led him to insist
that reason, like all our other natural powers and capacities, has been
damaged by sin. Yet it did not require him to say that natural theology-where reason seeks to "prove God's existence, determine the nature
of many of His attributes, discern our obligations to Him, and establish
the credibility of scripture" (p. 9)-was thereby made impossible.
Uninstructed human reason, Edwards thought, is likely to go very far
astray, but even sin-damaged natural reason can demonstrate some of
natural theology's claims to be true, provided it does not have to discover
them. And Scripture reveals many of these claims to us. Moreover, natural reason can know that the Scriptures are God's revelation. So
"'[d]ivine testimony'" can become "a rule of reason, a kind of evidence,
and a type of argument like the 'human testimony of credible eye-witnesses,' 'credible history,' 'memory,' 'present experience,' 'geometrical
mensuration,' 'arithmetical calculation,' and 'strict metaphysical distinction and comparison'" (p. 15; the internal quotations here and elsewhere
are from Edwards).5 Scripture can then be used to establish other
truths-e.g., that there is a difference in kind and not merely in degree
between those human beings who are spiritually regenerate and those
who remain naturally unregenerate 6-that are far beyond uninstructed
reason's ken.
So reason, according to Edwards, even reason unassisted by grace,
can-and, in fact, occasionally does-achieve '''a kind of assent ... to the
truths of the Christian religion, from the rational proofs or arguments
that are offered to evince it'" (p. 17). Indeed, we should expect natural
reason to have this ability, if Christianity correctly claims that God will
someday justly reward or punish each of us for our belief or disbelieF
Yet natural reason seldom achieves such assent. Why is this?
Edwards's answer is that we do not believe rightly because we do not
inquire rightly; and we do not inquire rightly because we lack '''a disposition to improve' the 'light' God has given us" (p. 17).
This "depraved disposition," Edwards argued, is "natural to all
mankind" (OS, p. 148); it is only remedied supernaturally, by infusions
of common or special grace." Edwards's most interesting epistemologi-
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cal claims concern the epistemic changes that follow on the infusion of
special grace. Wainwright examines two of the ways that Edwards
claims our grasp of religious truths is affected by such grace.
Most fundamentally, it changes our hearts. 9 Edwards, like most
Reformed theologians, thought that while all human beings can attain to
'" a kind of assent ... to the truths of the Christian religion, from the
rational proofs or arguments that are offered to evince it'," a saving
knowledge of God's work in Christ cannot be arrived at without God's
special aid. For a saving knowledge of God's work in Christ requires
the Holy Spirit so to indwell and regenerate the hearts of his elect that
He becomes, for them, "a principle or spring of new nature and life"
(RA, p. 200). It is His life in them that brings spiritual light and know 1edge-spiritual light and knowledge so different from anything that the
unregenerate can experience that "conversion is often compared to
opening the eyes of the blind" (RA, p. 204). And from this it follows,
Edwards concludes, "that in those gracious exercises and affections
which are wrought in the minds of the saints, through the saving influences of the Spirit of God, there is a new inward perception or sensation of

their minds, entirely different in its nature and kind, from anything that ever
their minds were the subjects of before they were sanctified" (RA, p. 205; my
emphasis). This involves God laying "a new foundation ... in the
nature of the soul" for an entirely "new kind of exercises of the ... faculty of understanding" that enables the saved to apprehend for the first
time the true spiritual beauty of God and His works (RA, p. 206; d.
Wainwright, p. 2Sf.). And the saved apprehend this because God produces "a new simple idea" (RA, p. 205) in their minds-the idea of "the
beauty of holiness" (RA, p. 260).10
Wainwright spends over ten pages examining these claims about a
new simple idea and a new supernatural sense to see if they make any
clear sense. He then explores how the heart's experience of true spiritual beauty can result in reason's grasping various religious truths. For
Edwards, "true virtue"-or "benevolence to Being in general"-is the
mechanism underlying the new spiritual sense. ll So if, as Wainwright
observes, "we can show that benevolence has a foundation in the nature
of things, we can conclude that the spiritual sense, too, is aligned with
reality" (p. 34). Edwards's best attempts to show that benevolence has
such a foundation presuppose theistic metaphysics; and so Wainwright
spends a couple of pages showing why this does not involve him in circularity. As Wainwright says, Edwards's account of this sense of the
heart" goes some way toward filling an important gap in contemporary
discussions-the failure adequately to explain how theistic belief-producing mechanisms operate" (p. 40), which is important both for judging the reliability of such mechanisms and for having any hope of judging which of several such mechanisms is most likely to be the one that
produces true beliefs.
The second way that special grace may affect our grasp of religious
truths is that it can sanctify reason, where reason, taken as our power to
grasp truth, is contrasted with the heart, as that which grasps beauty or
excellency. It does this both by removing prejudices Uland so lay[ing]
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the mind more open to the force of arguments'" and by positively
enlightening and assisting us to see the force of rational arguments by
'''adding greater light, clearness and strength to the judgment'" (p. 43).
These claims become philosophically interesting when Wainwright
details them; but space prohibits me from spelling them out.
Since Wainwright's larger project is not only to put Edwards's position
back on the table but also to convince us that it is more difficult to refute
than we may have previously thought, he then devotes a chapter apiece to
the somewhat similar views of John Henry Newman and William James.
Newman, he thinks, demonstrates that "the properties Edwards finds in
religious reasoning are features of all [informal] reasoning," while James
shows in some detail how "[iJnquiry in the humanities and social sciences,
in everyday life, and even in science unavoidably reflects ... our 'willing'
or 'passional' nature-our temperament, needs, concerns, fears, hopes,
passions, and 'divinations'" (p. 5). James's account, unlike Edwards's and
Newman's, has the added advantage of making its points without presupposing theistic metaphysics.
Wainwright's second-to-the-last chapter confronts two interrelated
objections: first, that positions like these are epistemically and morally
objectionable precisely because they allow the passions a place in the
reasoning process-which Wainwright argues begs the question "by
implicitly assuming theism is false or that subjective qualifications are
not needed to know God" (p. 115)-and, secondly, that this defense of
these positions is vitiated by circularity-to which Wainwright replies
that, while "theists do rely on their own assessments of the evidence's
force, and this commits them to thinking that they are in a superior epistemic position with respect to its evaluation[,] ... any reliance on one's
own assessments in matters of basic dispute involves similar assumptions" (p. 116). There is, then, no "non-question-begging way of mutually resolving basic disagreements" for either side in these epistemological
discussions (p. 123). Recognizing this, however, raises "the specter of
relativism" (p. 124); and so Wainwright devotes a final chapter to discussing what fundamental disagreements over basic standards of rationality imply. His conclusion is that views like these can actually help to
defuse relativism by explaining why such fundamental disagree-ments
exist and persist. An "Epilogue" gives us more reasons to take such
views seriously.
Anyone who is familiar with Wainwright's writings knows that much
of the strength of his work lies in his careful, analytical elucidation of
what various claims may mean and in his meticulous assessments of the
strengths and weaknesses of various arguments. I have resisted engaging him on that level for fear that his more general claims would thereby
be obscured. Indeed, my one serious reservation about this book is that
Wainwright's painstaking attention to some of the details of Edwards's,
Newman's, and James's historical positions tends to make it hard for a
reader to see the forest for the trees. Yet ultimately it is his attention to
those details that guards the general position from being rejected out of
hand. This book does succeed "in placing a neglected view back on the
table" in a way that ought to convince its readers "that positions such as
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Edwards's"-who was consciously committed to defending the theology of historic Reformational Protestantism-"are more difficult to refute
than they previously may have thought" (p. 6).
NOTES
1. On Locke's opinions see, especially, Nicholas Wolterstorff, John Locke
and the Ethics of Belief (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
2. See p. 149ff. See, as well, Plato, Republic, 401d-402a, which

Wainwright does not cite. As Wainwright does make clear, Plato thought
that our hearts' states affect more than our grasp of practical principles; they
affect how we think about metaphysical issues as well. Kant thought the
same thing.
3. From whose pages, Edwards said, he had received more pleasure
"than the most greedy miser finds when gathering up handfuls of silver and
gold."
4. So, e.g., it is not uncharacteristic for Edwards to begin his Dissertation
concerning the end for which God created the world with a chapter entitled
"What Reason Teaches Concerning This Affair."
5. So the second and final chapter of Edwards's Dissertation concerning
the end for which God created the world is entitled "What Is to Be Learned from
Holy Scriptures Concerning God's Last End in the Creation of the World."
6. See especially Religious Affections (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1959), Part III, First Sign (especially pp. 197-210). Hereafter cited intratextually as "RA".
7. Edwards's acceptance of this conditional is perhaps clearest in Part 1,
Chapter I, Section 6 of Original Sin (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1970; hereafter cited intratextually as "OS"), which is entitled, "The corruption of man's nature appears by its tendency, in its present
state, to an extreme degree of folly and stupidity in matters of religion". Edwards assumes a Calvinist view on nonbelief here, which sees nonbelief as
always being the consequence of culpable actions or omissions on the nonbeliever's part. (E.g., "if ... every age, and every nation, and every man,
[has] sufficient light afforded, to know God, and to know and do their
whole duty to him; then their inability to deliver themselves must be a
moral inability, consisting in a desperate depravity, and most evil disposition of heart" [aS, p. 151].).
Several of us have argued similarly since. See, e.g., the final section of my
"Starting from Scripture," in Robert C. Roberts and Mark R. Talbot, eds.,
Limning the Psyche: Explorations in Christian Psychology (Grand Rapids and
Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1997), and the articles
by George Schlesinger, David Basinger, and myself cited there. In Divine
Hiddenness and Human Reason (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,
1993), J.L. Schellenberg claims that my 1989 Faith and Philosophy piece, "Is It
Natural to Believe in God?," "is the only piece of writing in the contemporary literature of philosophy of religion devoted in its entirety to defending
the Calvinist view of nonbelief" and then spends eight pages attacking it.
Actually, my primary purpose in that article was more to articulate Calvin's
position than to defend it-and so my defense was deliberately short and
incomplete. Schellenberg would claim that Edwards's (and Wainwright's)
similar epistemological claims would fall prey to similar objections,
although Wainwright's book goes a long ways towards answering them.
8. In Reformed thought, common grace is available to everyone;
regarding reason, it "helps the faculties 'to do that more fully which they do
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by nature,' strengthening 'the natural principles [e.g., conscience] against
those things that tend to stupify [sic] it and to hinder its free exercise'" (p.
42; the bracketed interpolations are Wainwright's). Special grace is extended only to God's elect and it is by its infusion that they become regenerate,
with all that that entails, epistemically and otherwise.
9. For more on this, see the last section of my "Starting from Scripture,"
op. cit. As I say there, in Scripture the heart stands for the center of our personalities, the seat and source of all our powers-rational, volitional, emotional, and spiritual-and as such it ultimately determines what we believe,
feel, do, and say. Consequently, throughout Scripture its change is singled
out as the central and decisive factor in saving belief.
10. So the full picture, according to Edwards, is this:
there is given to those that are regenerated, a new supernatural sense,
that is as it were a certain divine spiritual taste, which is in its whole
nature diverse from any former kinds of sensation of the mind, as tasting is diverse from any of the other five senses, and ... something is
perceived by a true saint in the exercise of this new sense of mind, in
spiritual and divine things, as entirely different from anything that is
perceived in them by natural men, as the sweet taste of honey is
diverse from the ideas men get of honey by looking on it or feeling of
it [RA, 259f.].
11. Jonathan Edwards, Ethical Writings (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1989), p. 540. This is found in the second of Edwards's
Two Dissertations, entitled, The Nature of True Virtue. The first dissertation is
the previously cited Dissertation concerning the end for which Cod created the
world. In the sentence after the one quoted in the text, Edwards says that
true virtue, "perhaps to speak more accurately, ... is that consent, propensity and union of heart to Being in general, that is immediately exercised in a
general good will."

Experience of God and the Rationality of Theistic Beliefby Jerome I.
Gellman. Cornell University Press, 1997. Pp. x and 211. $32.50 (cloth)
JOHN ZEIS, Canisius College
As the author states in the Preface, "This book was written from the conviction that in an impressive number of instances God has been and continues to be known in experience"(p. ix). Gellman's book is an articulation of an argument that on the basis of the apparent experiences of God,
it is rational to believe that God exists. A convenient way to view
Gellman's project is as an attempt at a synthesis and strengthening of
the arguments from religious experience found in the works of Richard
Swinburne in The Existence of God and William Alston in Perceiving God.
Like Swinburne, he relies heavily upon a version of the Principle of
Credulity. Unlike Swinburne, and like Alston, Gellman argues that
apparent perceptions of God are sufficient on their own to show the
rationality of belief in God. Gellman thinks that he provides a successful
argument for a strong rationality thesis which leads him, unlike Alston,

